Activists called for civil disobedience to coincide with the first anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, with a number of youth figures and movements announcing that civil disobedience is the only option capable of forcing the military to hand over power as soon as possible. Then, they called on all Egyptians to participate in the February 11 strike – the first anniversary of the resignation of Egypt’s former president – and then the civil disobedience.

First: Advocates and Supporters

Most of the youth protest movements embraced the call for the strike, while student unions and private universities (especially the American University) announced their intention to join the strike. The call for the strike was also backed by Dr. ElBaradei, Dr. Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh and Dr. Sayf Al-Din Abdel-Fattah. Generally, with the exception of the liberal Free Egyptians Party, the parties embracing this call had left-wing leanings. The parties: Tajammu’a, Socialist Alliance, Socialist Party of Egypt, and the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, in addition to the Revolutionary Socialists and the April 6 Youth Movement announced they would join the strike.

Also Coptic movements took part, with the Copts for Egypt movement, Free Copts and Maspero Youth Union joining the strike.

Second: Rejectionists

All Islamic political parties, groups and movements announced their rejection of the call to this strike and civil disobedience. The Muslim Brotherhood, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), Nour party, the Islamic Group, Wassat party, and most of the Egyptian presidential candidates, as well as the Wafd party stood united and clearly called for everyone to reject the strike.

For its part, the state mobilized all its print and broadcast media (national press, official satellite channels, radio), bolstering its campaign with a clear position of Al-Azhar and the Mufti as well as the Church who announced it would be a great sin to participate in the strike or disrupt business and harm the interests of the people. It is worth noting, here, that last Friday’s prayer speech was unified in many of the mosques of the General Endowment and Sharia Society in their rejection of civil disobedience, announcing that it is unlawful from an Islamic perspective.

Third: Size of response to civil disobedience call

There have been no signs or manifestations of civil disobedience, nor strike action, in any state institutions, while all observers and monitors agreed that service was normal for trains, ports, the Suez Canal and factories, especially the industrial city Mahalla Al-Kubra. School attendance was also normal, with limited protests by some high school students in Cairo and Alexandria, and a number of demonstrations by hundreds of students at the universities of Cairo, Ain-Shams and Alexandria, as well as the American University and the German University. With universities determined they would continue the strike for three days. In general, the call to civil disobedience has not received any significant response. The failure of the strike is obvious, prompting the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) to thank the enlightened Egyptian people – as it described them – who have announced in a new kind of referendum that they seek work and production, and reject uncalculated adventures.

Fourth: The most important reasons for the failure of the call for civil disobedience

1)      The official position which managed to fully unify its media machine against civil disobedience, and to promote the official position of religious figures (the grand Sheikh of Al Azhar, the Mufti, Pope Shenouda), and other non-official figures (Dr. Qaradawi, Sheikh Mohamed Hassan, etc).

2)      The increasing economic pressure weighing in on citizens, repeated crises of living, and the recent deterioration of the security situation caused a kind of general displeasure with demonstrations and sit-ins, and brought about a quieter approach with less confrontation.

3)      The confusion of the call itself, as well as failure to clarify the nature of civil disobedience, whether it was a strike or insurrection, which gave the opposite campaign the chance to question the goal of the call and to highlight its dangers for the economy and the stability of the state (the official ‘anti’ campaign adopted the argument that activists are seeking to destroy the state and to sabotage its institutions and cause the collapse of the economy etc), especially since the masses supposed to be called for disobedience are not the virtual communities on the social networks.

4)      Non-participation of the real popular forces and stakeholders, namely the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis, as well as recognized liberals like the Wafd party, and most presidential candidates.

Fifth: Indicators and Implications of the scene

A. The purpose of the call: One must wonder about the reasons for such deliberate non-disciplined escalation against SCAF, without a clear vision of the need, the route or the destination of this escalation. The call for ‘civil disobedience until SCAF steps down’ in addition to being incomprehensible, it is clearly nihilistic (without objective meaning, purpose or value), especially since the date of registration for presidential candidacy has been brought forward, legislative independence is almost complete – with the Shura Council elections coming to an end – and the Constituent Assembly is about to be formed.

Whether all activists and advocates or some of them are deliberately targeting this, at this stage civil disobedience does not serve any interests but contributes to a scenario of chaos, terror and destruction, which would justify the military turning against the path of democratic transformation, supported by the desire of ordinary Egyptians for stability and security. At best, disobedience would produce more economic and security problems, as well as serious challenges, which would accumulate in the waiting for any upcoming government.

B. Exposure and popular isolation of activists and advocates: This is the most significant event in terms of popular rejection. The same activists and stakeholders were able to mobilize larger numbers on other occasions. They did not expect such a failure. Perhaps they did not appreciate that they are betting on the ability of the public to risk their daily bread (about 8 million workers per day). Moreover, this is proof of the decline of revolutionary momentum versus popular concerns for security, stability and the economy, especially with the progress being made according to the roadmap agreed upon recently and the calls of mainstream Islamists to commit to the steps agreed upon.

C. Public skepticism of official discourse: Despite the success of SCAF in using state institutions to contain the call for civil disobedience, this does not indicate a return of confidence in the official discourse, whether political or religious. Indeed, the stance of Al-Azhar, Fatwa and the Church was met with disapproval even by those who rejected the call for civil disobedience, as a stance that brings to mind state-control via religious institutions before the revolution. It has lost Al-Azhar a lot of confidence that had been restored since Mubarak stepped down.

D. The future of popular mobilization: Has the Egyptian Revolution lost its ability to mobilize? This is a quite important question considering what is happening on the scene, especially with the need for continuing public pressure as an effective weapon, in the next phase.

There is no doubt that the energy of the street to stay in revolt fell significantly for various reasons. No broad popular participation can be expected in any protest except where there is evidence of a serious deviation from the roadmap agreed for the transition of power. It is not unlikely that reliance will primarily be on the solid mobilization powers associated with the Islamists (the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis in particular), especially since they have the legitimacy of parliamentary majority and are responsible for maintaining the process of democratization.

Conclusion:

The strike failed for internal and external reasons:

Internal reasons are related to the confused nature of the call for the strike, and also the exaggerated confidence based on interactions and virtual crowd mobilization on social networks, and via certain satellite TV channels (OnTV, CBC, Tahrir) and some newspapers (most notably Tahrir), all the while being separated from and oblivious to the general mood of the people.

The external causes relate to the state’s administrative and media institutions as well as official religious institutions, standing united against the call for civil disobedience, and actually calling on the people to reject it. Evoking the power of the street for revolutionary pressure remains a major challenge that rests on the shoulders of the Islamic movement which is starting a new phase of the democratization process (writing the Constitution), which may need some sort of popular pressure at a certain moment.

Political Analysis and Monitoring Unit

 

Abdel-Moneim Abdel-Maksoud, Muslim Brotherhood (MB) lawyer, said that, ever since its inception in March 1928, the group insisted on acquiring legitimacy under Egyptian law. He pointed out that the MB originated under the provisions of law as well as recognized constitutional provisions. It was established, from the outset, as a fully legal entity. It was never, at any time, in violation of the provisions of the law.

During an interview in the program ‘Hona Al-Assima’ on the satellite channel ‘CBC’, Abdel-Maksoud said that when the group applied for registration, to the Egyptian judiciary, there was a legal debate about the MB’s activities, goals and objectives. Eventually, the judiciary confirmed, in no ambiguous terms, that the group had been granted legal status that cannot be impugned, stripped off or withdrawn, and that the right of association was guaranteed by the Constitution for all citizens.

On the MB’s legal cover, Abdel-Maksoud said, “The Egyptian judiciary confirmed that the Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamic establishment and a group, not a limited type of ‘Society’, and that it gained its moral character due to its formation on the basis of established principles, and that if the group violated any laws, judicial authorities should intervene”.

Further, Abdel-Maksoud pointed out that there are a number of laws that govern the MB’s affairs. For example, with regard to charitable activities, it is governed by the law of charitable association; while, for its political activities, it is governed by the law of political parties.

In conclusion, Abdel-Maksoud said, “What we want to emphasize, now, is that as the group originated and formulated its character, it gained legitimacy from an essential, comprehensive legal system.
 

Dr. Mohamed Morsi, Chairman of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), on Sunday afternoon, met with Jon Hansen Bauer, Norwegian Foreign Minister Envoy to the Middle East, and Tor Wennesland, Norway’s Ambassador in Cairo.

Dr. Mohamed Morsi, underscored the need to develop and strengthen Norwegian-Egyptian relations in all political and economic fields, especially after the revolution of January 25.

Dr. Morsi said that the situation in Egypt is improving, especially with the completion of parliamentary elections, the holding of first post-revolution People’s Assembly sessions, the completion of the first phase of the Shura Council elections, and soon the formation of the Constituent Assembly of the constitution, then the presidential elections.

The FJP Chairman stressed that the party is ready to assume its responsibilities, as the party of parliamentary majority, for the formation of a coalition government, in cooperation with other parties, pointing to the importance of evoking a spirit of cooperation and integration between the various political forces and stakeholders to accomplish the goals of the revolution and the oversight and legislative functions of Parliament.

Dr. Morsi added that the FJP sees the need for balanced international relations, based on essential mutual interests.

The FJP Chairman called upon the Norwegian official to urge his country to support the democratization process taking place in the Arab Spring revolutions, especially in Syria where the regime is carrying out massive violations against the rights of the Syrian people, and also to support the rights of the Palestinian people against Israeli violations in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

In response to statement released by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) yesterday on the first anniversary of the outsetting of Mubarak’s regime, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) announced today that while SCAF decided to begin registering nominees for presidential elections would start on March 10, 2010, it has failed to set date for the actual elections, which is demanded by the masses, and will help ease up the current state of tension and absorb much of the anger, therefore we call on SCAF to respond to such a demand.

Furthermore, the MB also criticized SCAF for failure to pin point those responsible for undermining the revolution and state’s institutions 

“SCAF’s statement  discussed a conspiracy targeting the Revolution and undermining the  state’s  institutions in order to  cause chaos. Such comments may be reiterated by the average citizen however it’s unacceptable that SCAF with its executive power to say as such. Loyal citizens have continued to call for transparency and honest reports and  for the accountability of those responsible in incidents unfolded in Maspero, Mohamed Mahmoud Street and the Cabinet building. If instigators were tried and accordingly punished then further incitement of chaos which claimed hundreds of lives would have been prevented.

The MB reiterated the support the Egyptian military enjoys among the public, and downplayed attempts to cause sedition between the people and the military

 

“statement highlighted that attempts to cause sedition between the people and the military will not succeed since the Egyptian people are supportive of their military and appreciate their efforts and sacrifices. It stressed that any differences between political factions will by no means escalate to clashes between the people and the military”

 

Sources denied rumors reported about 54 Christian families of Nahda village (in the Egyptian seaport city of Alexandria) receiving threats to evacuate their homes on the background of a crisis that broke out between Muslims and Christians there, after the recent circulation of video footage showing scenes of an illicit relationship between a young Christian “tailor” and a Muslim woman of bad reputation.

Ahmed Gad, Member of Parliament for the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), MP Ahmed Al-Sharif and MP Essam Hassanein sought to contain the crisis quickly. An FJP delegation visited the village to try and help resolve the crisis. The Governor of Alexandria also joined the delegation in the village, and delivered a speech to Nahda people, urging them to show restraint, stressing that necessary measures have been taken to control the crisis.

Furthermore, MP Ahmed Gad delivered a speech, stressing the depth of the relationship between Muslims and Christians in Egypt, pointing to the unity, solidarity and harmony highlighted in the January 25 (2011) Revolution, as well as in other crises that came to pass in Egyptian society. He called for calm, in order for the village to emerge from the crisis peacefully, safely. He also underscored the importance of the Egyptians being all one hand, especially in these difficult circumstances experienced by the country.

The delegation of Alexandria MPs reached an agreement with the village’s people regarding several points aimed at resolving the crisis, which include: the formation of popular committees to protect the homes of Christians; the formation of a committee of People’s Assembly MPs and a number of the village’s senior figures to discuss the problem in the appropriate legal framework, and bringing to justice the person or persons who breached the law – from both sides. That Committee has already been formed, comprising MPs Ahmed Gad, Ahmed Al-Sharif and Essam Hassanein.

For his part, the village chief and elder Ateyya Abu-Doma – popular committee leader in Nahda village – also denied reports of any intention to evict village Copts, pointing out that the village’s elders continue to hold urgent reconciliation meetings, so as to take all necessary measures and actions to resolve the problem.

As the Muslim Brotherhood ascends to power, a question remains on how the once “banned” group will handle the issue of ties with the Arab Gulf states.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are today the two states in the Gulf that are most skeptical of the Muslim Brotherhood. And yet these are precisely the two countries that Egypt’s Brotherhood must try its best to build bridges with. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are, after all, the two largest economies in the Arab world, and the biggest investors in Egypt despite what other Gulf countries claim. Almost 500 UAE firms operate in Egypt with investments valued at US$ 10 billion, the same amount invested by Saudis. The latter have additionally promised to grant Egypt several billion dollars in aid. It is also worth noting that 1.5 million Egyptians work and live in Saudi Arabia, while 250,000 Egyptians are residents of the UAE.

The Muslim Brotherhood, however, does enjoy a semi-recognized status in two other Gulf states. For instance, although it suffered a recent elections setback in Bahrain’s previous parliament, the Menbar Society, a Bahraini offshoot of the Brotherhood, had previously held six seats out of a total of 40, in addition to the post of second deputy speaker. In Kuwait, Islamists won an overwhelming majority of seats in parliament this month with the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood, known as the Islamic Constitutional Movement, winning all four seats it contested in the 50-seat body, doubling the number they had earlier held.

As of today, though, representatives of Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been alone among Gulf states in announcing their skepticism of Egypt’s Brotherhood. A recent opinion column by Tariq al-Homayed, editor of the London-based Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper that is owned by Saudi Prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz, criticized what he called “disciples” who “come out to defend the Muslim Brotherhood, acting as if they are the Muslim Brotherhood ambassadors to Saudi Arabia or other Gulf states.” Additionally, in a widely circulated video recording of a recent speech in Bahrain, Dubai’s police chief, who enjoys close relations with the country’s prime minister, warned against the Muslim Brotherhood, stating that their “threat” to the region was just as serious as that of Iran’s. Additionally, I outlined in an article in Gulf News last year how a petition calling for reform sent to the UAE government by 130 academics was stillborn due to the fact that some of the signatories were affiliated with the Brotherhood in the country.

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Vehemently condemning the brutal Syrian regime’s atrocities against the people, the Arab Solidarity Forum expressed its deepest regret and strong condemnation to the suffering of the Syrian people, amid Arab and international silence. 

The Forum stressed:  ”The Syrian regime, led by Al-Assad has begun a new phase of violence against its own people with the knowledge that Russia and China are protecting the regime and its policy of killing thousands of people”

Finding their position both incomprehensible and inexcusable, the Forum called for a general boycott of China and Russia, adding that it will hold conferences and vigils in front of the embassies of these countries in an effort to pressure them into withdrawing their support of Al-Assad’s regime.

Meanwhile, the Arab Academics’ Union, condemned the massacre in which claimed the lives of hundreds leaving countless wounded, in Homs, stressing that sectarianism and racism in our nations should be rejected and not neglected.

The Union held Al-Assad and his regime fully accountable for the horrific crimes held on Syrian soil. It called on all Arab intellectuals and academics to condemn Al-Assad and the disgraceful acts of genocide witnessed and to work towards the removal of the regime.